Electoral systems and international trade policy

Serkan Kucuksenel*, Osman Gulseven

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


We develop a simple theoretic game a model to analyze the relationship between electoral systems and governments' choice in trade policies. We show that existence of international pressure or foreign lobby changes a government's final decision on trade policy, and trade policy in countries with proportional electoral system is more protectionist than in countries with majoritarian electoral system. Moreover, lobbies pay more to affect the trade policy outcomes in countries with proportional representation systems.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)367-371
Number of pages5
JournalActual Problems of Economics
Issue number7
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes


  • Design
  • Electoral system
  • Lobby
  • Optimum of Poreto
  • Trade policy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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