TY - JOUR
T1 - Socially-Optimal and Nash Pareto-Based Alternatives for Water Allocation under Uncertainty
T2 - an Approach and Application
AU - Nafarzadegan, Ali Reza
AU - Vagharfard, Hassan
AU - Nikoo, Mohammad Reza
AU - Nohegar, Ahmad
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2018/7/1
Y1 - 2018/7/1
N2 - This study has proposed a methodology by enhancing an interactive algorithm to multi-objective optimization problems with interval parameters, in an attempt to reach the tradeoff between quality and reliability of the resultant optimum solutions. The earlier algorithm could turn into a prolonged procedure that deals with several players with different aspirations at different reliability, or risk, levels under non-deterministic conditions. Hence, it is not a pertinent approach to solve problems of water allocation between competing parties. The enhanced methodology aims to alleviate the burdens of the procedure and generate a unique set of solutions (i.e., near-Pareto-optimal alternatives), instead of a myriad of compromise solution sets. We have investigated a real-world hydro-environmental problem, the allocation of water between Dorudzan-Korbal irrigation networks and Bakhtegan Lake in Fars Province, Iran to assess feasibility of this methodology. In order to reach a consensus concerning the stakeholders’ individual preferences, we identified the compromise alternatives from the obtained sets of non-dominated solutions by taking advantage of various social choice rules and the Nash bargaining model. The results demonstrated that the developed methodology could incorporate the risk of system constraints violations (i.e., planning reliability under uncertainty) into the process of approximating the optimal tradeoff set of solutions. It also gave policymakers a chance to acquire perception into the potentially best compromise for land and water allocation schemes regarding the preference profiles of the involved interest groups.
AB - This study has proposed a methodology by enhancing an interactive algorithm to multi-objective optimization problems with interval parameters, in an attempt to reach the tradeoff between quality and reliability of the resultant optimum solutions. The earlier algorithm could turn into a prolonged procedure that deals with several players with different aspirations at different reliability, or risk, levels under non-deterministic conditions. Hence, it is not a pertinent approach to solve problems of water allocation between competing parties. The enhanced methodology aims to alleviate the burdens of the procedure and generate a unique set of solutions (i.e., near-Pareto-optimal alternatives), instead of a myriad of compromise solution sets. We have investigated a real-world hydro-environmental problem, the allocation of water between Dorudzan-Korbal irrigation networks and Bakhtegan Lake in Fars Province, Iran to assess feasibility of this methodology. In order to reach a consensus concerning the stakeholders’ individual preferences, we identified the compromise alternatives from the obtained sets of non-dominated solutions by taking advantage of various social choice rules and the Nash bargaining model. The results demonstrated that the developed methodology could incorporate the risk of system constraints violations (i.e., planning reliability under uncertainty) into the process of approximating the optimal tradeoff set of solutions. It also gave policymakers a chance to acquire perception into the potentially best compromise for land and water allocation schemes regarding the preference profiles of the involved interest groups.
KW - Agricultural water
KW - Conflict resolution
KW - Environmental water demand
KW - Interval optimization
KW - Planning reliability
KW - Voting
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U2 - 10.1007/s11269-018-1969-6
DO - 10.1007/s11269-018-1969-6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85044604815
SN - 0920-4741
VL - 32
SP - 2985
EP - 3000
JO - Water Resources Management
JF - Water Resources Management
IS - 9
ER -