ملخص
This study examines the impact of operational risk on CEO compensation in the property-liability insurance industry. We find that property-liability CEOs are not penalised for operational risk in terms of cash-based compensation, while they are penalised in terms of their option-based compensation. Our findings also suggest that CEOs are largely insulated from firm level operational losses in terms of their total compensation. These findings have implications for implementing optimal risk-based contracting decisions for CEO compensation contracts.
| اللغة الأصلية | English |
|---|---|
| الصفحات (من إلى) | 407-424 |
| عدد الصفحات | 18 |
| دورية | International Journal of Business Innovation and Research |
| مستوى الصوت | 12 |
| رقم الإصدار | 4 |
| المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء | |
| حالة النشر | Published - 2017 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
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