Traditional project scheduling methods inherently assume that the decision makers (DMs) are a unique entity whose acts are based on group rationality. However, in practice, DMs' reliance on individual rationality and the wish to optimize their own objectives skew negotiations towards their preferred solutions. This makes conventional project scheduling solutions unrealistic. Here, a new two-step method is proposed that seeks to increase the overall efficiency of project schedules without violating individual rationality criteria, to find scheduling solutions that are acceptable to all DMs. First, a genetic algorithm is combined with evidential reasoning (ER) to obtain near optimal project schedule alternatives with respect to the priorities of each DM, separately. Second, the fallback bargaining method is used to help the DMs reach a consensus on an alternative with the highest group satisfaction. The proposed model is tested on a benchmark project scheduling problem with over 3.6 billion possible project scheduling alternatives. The results show that the model helps DMs when appointing their preferences using a well-organized procedure to provide a transparent view of each project schedule performance solution. Furthermore, the model is able to absorb the maximum support from the DMs, not necessarily a unique entity, by collecting all the self-optimizing DMs' preferences and fairly allocating the benefits.
|الصفحات (من إلى)||389-420|
|دورية||International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making|
|المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء|
|حالة النشر||Published - مارس 1 2017|
ASJC Scopus subject areas